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Abstract: The paper describes the nature and role of accounting dur-
ing apprenticeship – the transition period from slavery to waged labor
in the British West Indies. Planters, colonial legislators, and Parlia-
mentary leaders all feared that freed slaves would flee to open lands
unless they were bound to plantations. Thus, rather than relying en-
tirely on economic incentives to maintain viable plantations, the Abo-
lition Act and subsequent local ordinances embodied a complex syn-
thesis of paternalism, categorization, penalties, punishments, and
social controls that were collectively intended to create a class of
willing waged laborers. The primary role of accounting within this
structure was to police work arrangements rather than to induce ap-
prentices to become willing workers. This post-emancipation, pre-
industrial formalization of punishment, valuation, and task systems
furnish powerful insights into the extent of accountancy’s role in sus-
taining Caribbean slave regimes.
INTRODUCTION
The paper describes the nature and role of accounting dur-
ing the so called period of “apprenticeship” in the British West
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Indies when the British government attempted to convert the
slave labor force into waged labor. Britain’s involvement in sla-
very dated from the 17th century, and was closely linked to the
rise of sugar production in the Caribbean. From the outset, the
demand for labor on sugar plantations far outstripped the sup-
ply of European immigrants, with slaves from Africa filling the
void. Britain had become the world’s leading exporter of slaves
from Africa by the mid-18th century, carrying some 1.6 million
slaves between 1760 and the abolition of the trade in 1807. Pro-
duction in the fields and sugar mills was organized on a quasi-
industrial scale, with a “tightly coordinated” labor force engaged
in “coerced, intensive and continuous” activity [Blackburn,
1988, p. 8]. The survival rate of slaves was low, partly because of
their concentration in the disease-ridden tropical lowlands, but
also due to neglect and overwork. The disproportionate number
of slaves in the Caribbean compared to Europeans resulted in
the retention of aspects of African culture, which gave the slaves
a sense of communal identity in the face of oppression
[Blackburn, 1988, pp. 5-8, 12, 21; Walvin, 1992, pp. 24-26].
The ascendancy of the planters was, however, relatively
short-lived. The focus of Britain’s economic interests shifted in
the early 19th century with the increase in domestic consump-
tion and the rise of new colonial markets. Slaveholding came to
represent “only a tiny fraction of total imperial wealth”
[Blackburn, 1988, p. 521], and the British government could
afford to compensate planters on emancipation without placing
great strain on the Treasury. From the late 18th century on-
wards, the planters faced concerted opposition from an evan-
gelical alliance which orchestrated arguably the most successful
popularist campaign of the 19th century. New imports of slaves
from Africa were outlawed in 1807, with abolition of slavery
following in 1834 [Blackburn, 1988, pp. 138-141, 302; Turley,
1991, pp. 3, 7, 11-14; Walvin, 1992, pp. 96-98].
The Abolition Act of 1833 established a four-to-six year ap-
prenticeship period following emancipation in the British
Crown Colonies during which time the liberated slaves, now
termed “apprentices,” were obliged to continue working for
their former masters. The very notion of Caribbean apprentice-
ship corresponded to British master and servant law. Appren-
tices were bound to their masters in Britain by an indenture for
a fixed period of time, usually seven years. Although an ap-
prentice was not paid wages, his master was obliged to provide
for his material needs and to train him in a craft. The master
also had legal rights, “entitling him to control his apprentice’s
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person.” Runaways could be punished with imprisonment; neg-
ligent or disobedient apprentices were to have their malfea-
sances “corrected” [Steinfeld, 1991, pp. 25-26].1 The precedents
under British law legitimized the continued “enslavement” of
plantation workers in the West Indies after emancipation by
providing an alternative form of binding and social control that
was traditionally accepted at home.
On March 27, 1834, some four months before slaves in the
colonies were emancipated and their apprenticeship as waged
workers began, E.G. Stanley, the Secretary of State for the Colo-
nial Department, wrote with some trepidation about this “great
national experiment . . . the success of which the country looks
forward to with much anxiety” [CO 318/118/55]. A few months
later on Christmas day, William Tharp, who was managing his
family’s sugar plantations in Jamaica, expressed the view that “if
God grants me help, I will see out this awful experiment and
keep things right as long as I can” [Furness, 1980, p. 11]. He had
just given evidence to the Jamaican House of Assembly, which
was investigating how emancipation was working. The point is,
emancipation was an experiment and contemporaries did not
know how it was going to turn out.
The Abolition Act also established a £20 million fund dis-
tributable to former slaveholders, but only if a colony’s legisla-
ture passed ordinances detailing work rules and punishment
schemes by August 1, 1834 when the Abolition Act would take
effect. A fund was seen as legitimate compensation for planters
who were forced to give up their property rights in human capi-
tal, although the apprentices were required to live on plantation
lands and do the same work as they had done as slaves. Planters
and local legislatures had virulently opposed ending slavery, but
their objectives generally aligned with the British government
once the Abolition Act was passed – to preserve plantation
economies and maintain an industrious and stable work force in
advance of full freedom. Holt [1992, p. 44] summarized the chal-
lenge faced by the British government and colonial legislatures:
“It was necessary that industrious habits be inculcated in some
manner; work discipline must be internalized by the freedmen
without the normal spur of necessity or desire. The problem was
to overcome the legacy of slavery”.
1 Steinfeld [2001, p. 6] argued that the use of criminal sanctions (e.g., im-
prisonment or corporal punishment) against British workers for breaking labor
agreements remained common practice in the 19th century and was not limited
to apprentices.
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Planters, colonial legislators, and Parliamentary leaders
alike feared that workers would flee plantations to open lands
and would work for former masters only under compulsion.
Thus, instead of providing economic incentives in the form of
market wages, output sharing, or land ownership, the Abolition
Act and subsequent local ordinances embodied a complex syn-
thesis of paternalism, categorization, penalties, punishments,
and social controls, underlain by accounting to ensure compli-
ance.
Clearly, apprenticeship was seen as an imperfect solution by
both slaves and planters. Slaves sought complete freedom, while
planters “resented their loss of arbitrary power [and] feared the
disintegration of a social and economic system which had pro-
vided them the highest rank and authority” [Green, 1976, p.
131]. Apprenticeship represented an attempt to sustain colonial
plantation economies by getting the freedmen accustomed to
work for wages, to accept the practice as normal, and to become
willing waged workers. Ultimately, the experiment failed and
apprenticeship was abandoned early. In the larger colonies,
former slaves retreated into the bush and became peasant farm-
ers. For them, plantation work became an occasional and
supplementary source of income. Planters had to import inden-
tured workers to fill the void. As profits declined, major British
investors chose to place their money elsewhere and divested
themselves of their plantations. The Caribbean sugar trade col-
lapsed and did not recover until the 20th century [Adamson,
1975, pp. 461-464; Hall, 1978; Paton, 2004, p. 9]. However, that
was all for the future. In 1833, the British government was de-
termined to make emancipation work, and employed the pano-
ply of social tools at its disposal to create a controlled environ-
ment through apprenticeship that was carefully designed to turn
slaves into a willing, waged work force.
Undoubtedly, the main rationale behind apprenticeship was
economic – to maintain production in the short-term by coer-
cion, to maintain tight control over labor costs, and to create a
class of willing waged laborers through education and indoctri-
nation in the longer term. Even transferring the right to issue
punishments from overseers to magistrates was arguably as
much about making the population willing to work through
regularizing relationships within the workplace as protecting
them from indiscriminate brutality.
However, there were major social implications as well. As
Holt [1992, p. 37] observed:
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The same Parliament that debated and approved the
abolition of slavery and entertained proposals for uni-
versal education enacted legislation to reform prisons,
poor relief, and the police. There were striking similari-
ties in the governance and discipline that they estab-
lished in penitentiaries, mental hospitals, workhouses,
schools, and reformatories.
Turley [1991, p. 108] described the interactions between aboli-
tion and the other reform initiatives as “multiple layers of inter-
locking activity.” For example, apprenticeship was connected
with the free-trade movement. Free traders argued that appren-
tices would only become truly free if plantations were exposed
to the competition of a free market. Otherwise, the price of
sugar would remain artificially high, and planters would have
no incentive to change “their old oppressive ways” [ibid., p.
126].
Similarly, the anti-vagrancy provisions of the Abolition Act
and local ordinances were fully consistent with the drive to out-
law vagrancy in Britain that saw 28 new acts between 1700 and
1824 [Wiener, 1990, p. 150; Rogers, 1994, p. 104].2 Accounting,
in fact, played a central role in the government initiative to
control the poor in Britain and to make the administration of
poor relief more efficient [Walker, 2004]. The system of labor
control that was employed on plantations prior to emancipation
also contained many features exhibited by the later scientific
management movement in industry [Aufhauser, 1973; Cooke,
2003]. The campaign for labor discipline exercised the minds of
abolitionists and industrialists alike. At home, inculcating the
labor force with regular working habits and a sense of “disci-
plined time” was regarded as a major problem [Thompson,
1967, pp. 81-84]. Factory masters like Richard Arkwright and
Josiah Wedgwood followed Bentham’s ideal of creating “Houses
of Industry” modeled on principles “of surveillance, regimenta-
tion and division of labor” [Davis, 1975, p. 456]. Abolitionists
like William Wilberforce lent their support to the promotion of
industrial discipline, “cushioned by a benevolent paternalism” in
Britain [ibid., p. 460]. The emphasis on “duty and subordina-
tion” during the crucial period of transition from slave to volun-
tary labor was only to be expected therefore [Davis, 1975, p.
465].
2 Davis [1975, p. 466] similarly described how the rise of antislavery senti-
ment in Britain coincided with the “urgent domestic problem” of imposing labor
discipline on an “immense, uprooted rural labor force.”
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Finally, the infliction of pain on ex-slaves as the penalty for
shirking work was entirely consistent with British home policy.
As Wiener [1990, p. 111] observed, the belief “that pain was
required for reformation was rarely questioned” in Britain. If
the prime purpose of the penal system at home was to inculcate
social deviants with work habits, and inflicting pain through
corporal punishment, physical deprivation, hard labor, or the
treadmill was a necessary part of the process, the same was
bound to be true in the colonies.
It is certainly possible to view apprenticeship through a
Marxist lens – that plantation accounting was not “modern” and
British capitalists, being fed up with subsidizing slavery, sought
to abolish it without establishing the crucial conditions for turn-
ing apprentices into wage workers.3 Thus, the system of labor
control depended on physical coercion rather than the economic
coercion of the market. Completely lacking was a system of in-
centives supported by accounting measures that would persuade
the apprentices that they would be better off working on the
plantations than subsisting as peasant farmers. However, the
principal motive behind apprenticeship was to enforce labor
turnout and maintain productivity within the confines of an
entrenched social structure that was both in decline and under
siege; and in this respect, economic rationalism provides a good
explanation of the accounting system that was adopted.
The paper proceeds by describing the rules of apprentice-
ship and considers accounting in conjunction with apprentice-
ship as linked elements of social control and economic rational
behavior. Subsequently, the role of accounting during appren-
ticeship is examined in the context of the mid-19th century cam-
paign in Britain to instill labor discipline and to create a willing
class of waged workers to service the nation’s industries.
RULES OF APPRENTICESHIP
The Abolition Act of 1833 embodied a comprehensive
framework for the transition from slavery to waged labor. It
3 As one reviewer noted, Marxist theorists might see apprenticeship as main-
taining the feudal/slave owners’ focus on use-values and that accounting’s role
was to allow the former slave owners to continue with their previous labor
practices. In other words, the accounting system reflected the planters’ preoccu-
pation with controlling the use-value of labor rather than the capitalists’ preoc-
cupation with its economic value. We find merit in this perspective, but feel that
economic rationalism helps explain apprenticeship and the nature of accounting
therein and is, therefore, an equally compelling framework.
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served as a template for each colony’s unique set of rules and
regulations.4 The Abolition Act included specific measures as
well as guiding principles, but it left the mass of detail regarding
work behavior, task-rate levels, and punishment schemes,
amongst a host of other issues, to be hammered out by the
colonial legislatures [Green, 1976, p. 122]. For example, the
Abolition Act specified that apprentices would work no more
than 45 hours each week in return for food, housing, clothing,
and medical care, but each colony was to specify the length of
the workday, the specific allotment of food rations, and the
quantity of task work that could be substituted if mutually
agreed upon by master and apprentice. Finally, each colony’s
particular ordinances had to be approved by the Colonial Office
before its slave owners received any compensation.
It was widely believed that once the daily threat of flogging
was removed, former slaves would work on the plantations only
if an extensive network of rules, regulations, adjudication proce-
dures, paternalistic persuasion, education, policing, prison, and
punishment schemes were employed. As a result, the Abolition
Act included a complex set of legal and social controls to regu-
late the behavior of apprentices. James Carmichael Smyth, the
Governor of British Guiana, alluded to this point in a proclama-
tion to the slave population when he assumed office in June
1833. At that time, slaves were keenly aware that emancipation
was coming, although the specific rules for apprenticeship still
needed to be developed. Smyth’s remarks reveal the determina-
tion of the authorities to enforce standards of behavior during
the transition:
I wish to warn you, however, against all impatience,
disobedience to your masters, absence from your du-
ties, insubordination, rioting, or illegally assembling.
The peace and tranquility of the country must be main-
tained; and if you adopt any other conduct than that
which becomes peaceable and obedient subjects, you
will compel me, however unwillingly, to employ force
to uphold the existing laws… Every man in this world is
required to work in some way or other; and by the
command of the Almighty Father of us all, we must all
and each of us acquire our bread with the sweat of our
brow [Enclosure in Despatch 87, 29 July 1833, Smyth
to Stanley, British Parliamentary Papers (BPP), 1835,
Vol. 81, p. 240].
4 See CAP. 73 [pp. 666-691] in The Statutes of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Ireland, 3 & 4 William IV, 1833 for the complete act.
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Three months later Smyth issued another proclamation con-
gratulating the apprentices for following his “advice” [Enclosure
in Despatch 92, 2 October 1833, Smyth to Stanley, BPP, 1835,
Vol. 81, p. 252].
It certainly appears that slaves in British Guiana and
throughout the colonies expected many more liberties than they
were given by the Abolition Act or local ordinances. In early
August 1834, immediately after the Abolition Act took effect,
Smyth noted that, “The Honourable Mr. Bean has written to me
recommending the proclaiming of martial law within certain
districts” [Enclosure in Despatch 114, 9 August 1834, Smyth to
Stanley, BPP, 1835, Vol. 81, p. 287]. Although Smyth did not
support Bean’s request, he did review the process for handling
apprentice complaints. The office of “slave protector” had served
as the official mechanism for complaints, but this office expired
with the Abolition Act’s passage. In its stead, Smyth proposed
that apprentices would refer all of their complaints to the “high
sheriff,” who would record details in a book that would be for-
warded to the special magistrate of the district and in summary
to Smyth. An Office of Special Magistrate was created by the
Abolition Act and will be discussed subsequently within the con-
text of the entire judicial superstructure.
The Abolition Act, 1833 distinguished between praedial ap-
prentices, who worked in agriculture and produce, and non-
praedials, who chiefly served as domestics. Praedials were lim-
ited to 45 hours of required work and were to gain full freedom
in 1840 after a six-year apprenticeship; non-praedials worked
longer hours and were to be freed two years earlier. It appears
that many planters attempted to classify their apprentices as
praedials in order to gain the additional two years of captive
service. For example, one of Smyth’s special magistrates re-
ported that:
Numerous cases having been submitted to me by ap-
prenticed labourers, complaining of their employers
having ordered them to do praedial work, to which
many of them had never in their lives been subjected
. . . [I] have found them, on the admission of their em-
ployers, to be substantially correct [Enclosure B in Des-
patch 250, 13 November 1835, Smyth to Glenelg, BPP,
1836, Vol. 83, p. 101].
The formation by the Abolition Act of a group of adjudica-
tors called Special Magistrates proved of major significance.
These men would play the key role in implementing the Aboli-
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tion Act by “combining the roles of judge, teacher, and taskmas-
ter” [Holt, 1992, p. 57]. The range of their responsibilities was
immense – they listened to complaints, adjudicated cases, speci-
fied punishments, participated in appraisals, assessed fines, filed
regular reports, and administered floggings for violations of the
Abolition Act and their local ordinances. They were charged
with enforcing the Abolition Act, ensuring that the apprentices
put in the requisite number of labor hours, while protecting
them from overwork, abuse, or mistreatment.
The ability of the judiciary to act impartially was question-
able, however. In the case of British Guiana, the colony was to
be divided into 12 judicial districts (later increased to 15), each
with its own special magistrate. But by the Abolition Act’s effec-
tive date, only four special magistrates had arrived from Britain.
Smyth, therefore, promoted eight local justices to the position of
special justice to fill the gap, all of whom had ties with the local
plantocracy. Of the 67 local magistrates who either were serving
or had served as special justices in British Guiana through
March 1835, only four were noted as “Unconnected with Colo-
nial Property.” The remainder were described as “Planter,”
“Planter and Attorney,” “Attorney,” or “Attorney and Merchant”
[Slavery Abolition Proceedings, 12 March 1835, BPP, 1835, Vol.
81, pp. 1087-1090]. George Lowenfeld, a typical appointee, de-
scribed himself as “one of the Representatives of the Estates of
the late Woffert Katz; three of these are coffee estates – the one
named Gebroeden is under my particular charge” [CO 111/151,
p. 281]. It was only to be expected that with such connections to
land owners, the adjudications of local justices would be heavily
biased in favor of planter interests [Turner, 1999].
In the hopes of achieving impartiality, the 1833 Abolition
Act specified that only the special magistrates and special jus-
tices appointed by the British government could try apprentices
or planters for breaches of the Abolition Act. Locally appointed
justices in British Guiana were deprived of that power in August
1835 [Enclosure in Despatch 162, 9 January 1838, Smyth to
Glenelg, BPP, 1837-38, Vol. 85, II, p. 205]. However, apprentices
rarely brought cases against planters, and when they did, it was
usually the planters’ views that were upheld [Paton, 2004, pp.
75-77]. It also appears that the majority of planters were dis-
tressed by any decisions that were rendered against them, espe-
cially if the outcome reduced the domination they had exercised
over workers under the slavery regime. The comments of
Spring-Rice, Secretary for War and the Colonies, are pertinent.
He advised Smyth:
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. . . to adopt a course as may secure for you the confi-
dence and support of the white population of the
Colony, when this can be done without a sacrifice in
principle. When the magnitude of the change effected,
and the difficulty which the best men feel in surrender-
ing power, is taken into account, many allowances
should be made for the proprietors of West India prop-
erty [Despatch 116, 7 November 1834, Spring Rice to
Smyth, BPP, 1835, Vol. 81, pp. 287-288].
The difficulties experienced in making the system work, es-
pecially during the early months of apprenticeship, were not
only explained by inherent bias or planter resistance, but also by
the apprentices’ understandable reluctance to comply with the
legislation. They were required to live and work on the planta-
tion; they could not occupy vacant lands or subsist solely on
provision-ground output.5 They were penalized, either through
imprisonment, extra work hours, or with a specified number of
“stripes,” for failing to follow strict rules of attendance, for being
insubordinate, for refusing to work, for being more than five
miles from their plantation without a written pass, or for not
working up to a standard of “assiduous and steady industry”
[CO 111/142, Caput (CAP) IV, Section 2, British Guiana Ordi-
nance].6 Apprentices were also precluded from purchasing land,
seeking other types of employment, or moving to another colony
without a passport issued only with the written consent of the
master. A detailed system of fines, extra work-hour require-
ments, and floggings was stipulated in the colonial ordinances
to enforce these rules. The only real change from their prior life
as slaves was that apprentices would receive wages, but only for
work done in excess of 45 hours per week when food rations
were provided, or for work exceeding 401⁄2 hours if apprentices
tended provision grounds in lieu of receiving rations.
ACCOUNTING AS A CONSTRUCT OF SOCIAL CONTROL
Accounting and accountability played a crucial role in bol-
stering the apprenticeship system. Work attendance, acts of in-
subordination, sub-scale work performance, and medical re-
ports all had to be recorded in a prescribed fashion in particular
journals so that when the special magistrates or justices made
5 Provision grounds were lands earmarked for the personal use of slaves on
the majority of larger Caribbean plantations.
6 According to Burn [1937, p. 179], stealing, malingering, and carelessness
with property were commonplace.
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regular visits or conducted special hearings, planters would be
able to document their complaints. Thus, while the apprentice-
ship system depended on the force of law, it was supported and
sustained by accounting evidence. In essence, accounting’s dual
roles were to maintain control over labor as well as to measure
the economic performance of labor. However, it was not just the
workers who were affected by accounting. The success of the
apprenticeship system as a transition to willing waged laborers
depended on the effectiveness of the judiciary, which was also
held accountable through regular reports to the Colonial Office
in London. The Colonial Office, attempting to regulate the
whole process, demanded a range of other data, including lists
of appraisements and public sales to ensure that the Abolition
Act and local ordinances were properly applied.
Although each colony’s regulations varied to a degree, they
all addressed the same set of issues outlined in the 1833 Act.
Uniformity enabled local officials to compare the performance
of apprentices and special magistrates and justices in different
districts, and it enabled the Colonial Office to make inter-colony
comparisons based on the regular reports they received. In Oc-
tober 1835, for example, Smyth furnished the Colonial Office
with data concerning the declining number of punishments in
British Guiana during each of the previous four months [Des-
patch 242, 28 October 1835, Smyth to Glenelg, BPP, 1836, Vol.
83, p. 70].
It followed that the colonial ordinances differed in detail
rather than substance, as in the level of punishments (e.g., fines,
floggings, terms of imprisonment) that were authorized [Burn,
1937, p. 204]. The regulations relating to British Guiana were
typical. The July 26, 1834 issue of the Royal Gazette of British
Guiana contained the final version passed by the local assem-
bly.7 Several sections of this colony’s provisions had a direct
impact on accounting for and valuing labor as discussed below.
Enforcing Ownership Rights over Labor: The overall aim, ensur-
ing that the apprenticed laborers put in the requisite amount of
time on the plantations, could not have been accomplished with-
out accounting data to track it. This synergy was acknowledged
in CAP. I of the Ordinance relating to British Guiana where the
rationales underlying the detailed provisions that followed were
7 The document is entitled “An Ordinance for the Government and Regula-
tion of Apprenticed Labourers” and is reproduced in CO 111/142.
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listed. It acknowledged that the prime aim of Section 16 of the
Abolition Act [CO 111/142; CAP. 73, p. 672] was:
. . . ensuring the punctual discharge of the services due
by them [the apprentices] to their respective employers,
and . . . the prevention and punishment of indolence, or
the neglect or improper performance of work . . . secur-
ing exactness in the computation of the time during
which such Praedial Apprentices Labourers were
thereby required to labour in the service of such their
respective employers.
Labor control was achieved in British Guiana through the
appointment of a committee of “seven or eight of the most re-
spected planters” to develop a “reasonable tariff of the amount
of work each Negro ought to perform” [Despatch 102, 25 Febru-
ary 1834, Smyth to Stanley, BPP, 1835, Vol. 81, p. 262]. Accord-
ing to Burn [1937, p. 194], Smyth was the first governor in the
West Indies to call for the development of labor standards. The
committee, chaired by Charles Bean, prepared scales of task-
work for cane, plantain, coffee, cotton cultivation, and wood
cutting, based on what might be expected from an “effective
labourer” and “average weather and soils.” If apprentices did not
fully complete their prescribed tasks, they could be required to
work extra hours or be punished as specified in other sections of
the Ordinance. However, it was important that the apprentices
felt that the scales were reasonable to avoid civil unrest:
All attempts to impose upon the Negro, or to exact from
him more than a fair proportion of work, must be as
sedulously guarded against on the one side, as any act
of insubordination on the other; either would equally
lead to the interruption of peace of the province [Des-
patch 108, 2 July 1834, Smyth to Stanley, BPP, 1835,
Vol. 81, p. 274].
Partial scales for cane cultivation and wood cutting are repro-
duced in Table 1.
The underlying obligations of the apprentices to the planta-
tions were themselves carefully detailed, as documented in CAP.
V, Section 4 of the Ordinance:
. . . that every contract between the employer and the
praedial apprenticed labourer, for the performance of
any specified work as a task, and in lieu of the pre-
scribed daily labour, or for the performance of any
labour in extra hours, shall by such employer, be re-
duced into writing and entered into a book to be kept
12
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for that purpose on the plantation; which book it shall
be the duty of the Chairman or senior Special Justice of
the district to inspect as often as he shall, in the manner
aforesaid, repair to the several plantations within his
district.9
Plantations kept daily productivity accounts collectively for the
various work gangs. Accounts of the daily pickings, pulping, and
TABLE 1
Scales of Task-work in the Colony of British Guiana
Description of Work Work now Work to be
performed performed
in 9 hours in 71⁄2 hours
Cane Cultivation:
Digging new navigable canals,
12 feet wide and five feet deep,
and throwing the ground on both sides 600 cubic feet 500 cubic feet
Throwing back a six foot parapet from
the above, and levelling the ground 72 feet in length 60 feet in length
Digging new punt trenches as above,
where the ground is thrown on one side 480 cubic feet 400 cubic feet
Throwing back six feet parapets from
above 48 feet in length 40 feet in length
Digging new small drains 2 x 2 land
cleared 18 roeds8 15 roeds
Throwing out small drains one shovel
deep 50 roeds 42 roeds
Holing or banking land 21⁄2 x 21⁄2 36 roeds  30 roeds
Shovel ploughing new holed land a
shovel deep, and rounding beds 72 roeds 60 roeds
Wood Cutting – Squaring Timber:
Felling trees and squaring them for saw
 logs 25 cubic feet 21 cubic feet
Ditto, ditto for framing timber 18 ditto 15 ditto
Making wallaba shingles and carrying 200 each 175 each
them to a water carriage labourer labourer
Making staves, and heading and
carrying them as above 100 ditto 87 ditto
Cutting and cording hardwood for fuel 6 labourers 6 labourers
to four cords to three cords
Source: CO 318/128, West Indian Miscellaneous, 1837, Vol. 1.
8 The “roed” mentioned in the foregoing tariff is the Rhynland roed, equal to
12 feet and 4 inches nearly.
9 Establishing legal accountability through written contracts with accounts
to monitor compliance was also a feature of estate-management practice in
Britain [Oldroyd, 1999, pp. 186-187].
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milling on the Balcarres coffee plantations in Jamaica, for ex-
ample, have survived for the first four years of the apprentice-
ship period [Crawford Papers, 25/11/652-655].
A system of regular medical examinations was established
in order to prevent apprentices from avoiding work by feigning
illness. These examinations were again carefully documented for
possible later action in the courts. CAP. III, Section Six of Brit-
ish Guiana’s Ordinance described the responsibilities of the
medical examiner and his reporting requirements. If the illness
or injury was genuine, the key question then became, when
would the apprentice be fit enough to resume work?
And be it further enacted, that every person in this
colony having under his or her management forty ap-
prenticed labourers or upwards, shall, and is hereby
required, to engage a medical practitioner to visit such
apprenticed labourers once at least in every week; and
it shall be the duty of such medical practitioner, and he
is hereby authorised and required to keep a Journal,
and to enter the name of each apprenticed labourer
then labouring under sickness or disease, distinguish-
ing such apprenticed labourers as are thereby disquali-
fied for labour, and such as are disqualified for the
ordinary amount of labour, and prescribing such medi-
cines or articles of diet as may in his judgement be
necessary for the restoration of the patient; and such
journal shall be placed under the care of the employer
or manager of such apprenticed labourers.
Prior to apprenticeship, slaves customarily worked six 9-
hour days per week – a total of 54 hours. The Abolition Act
limited the number of hours apprentices worked for masters to
45, a reduction of one-sixth from the previous norm, but it al-
lowed each colony to determine the number of days over which
these hours would be spread. The apprentices in British Guiana
generally preferred working five 9-hour days rather than six 71⁄2-
hour days if given the choice [CO 111/132, p. 290]. Scales were
adjusted to convert 9-hour to 71⁄2-hour days by a fairly consistent
percent reduction to achieve the same level of performance on
an hourly basis. In either case, Sunday belonged to the appren-
tice. However, it was enforced “as a day of uninterrupted rest”
from any work, such as tending provision grounds, which in
Jamaica might lie as far as ten miles away [Burn, 1937, p. 177],
to ensure that the apprentices were fully rested by Monday
morning when they worked for the masters instead of them-
selves.
14
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Section 2 of British Guiana’s Ordinance converted the con-
cept of “assiduous and steady industry” into specific work-level
expectations. The scales were informational for masters and
overseers as well as for apprentices, and were developed, in part,
to deter masters and overseers from requiring inordinate levels
of output and effort. The Abolition Act, 1833 did not specify
whether an apprentice’s free time was contingent on his or her
demeanor or meeting scale targets. Bean’s summation, however,
revealed the planters’ intention to link them:
The committee recommend that this apportionment
shall be by giving five days’ labour or 45 hours to the
master, and one day, which they recommend to be Sat-
urday, to the apprenticed labourer; provided that in all
cases the consolidation of the daily time of one hour
and a half of the labourer into the Saturday of each
week shall only take place on the due and proper per-
formance of the daily task, and be consequent upon the
good, orderly and industrious conduct of the labourer,
and not otherwise [Enclosure in Despatch 111, 29 July
1834, Appendix B, Smyth to Stanley, BPP, 1835, Vol.
81, p. 282].
Smyth forwarded a copy of the special justice’s work in-
structions to Stanley, the Colonial Secretary, in order to demon-
strate the impartiality that special justices were expected to pur-
sue. In Section 6 of the document, Smyth described how
task-rate scales should be used to adjudicate complaints about
the “diligence or idleness of the labourers” [Enclosure in Des-
patch 111, Smyth to Stanley, BPP, 1835, Vol. 81, pp. 277-279].
However, the scales alone were inadequate for this purpose, ow-
ing to the vagaries of “the weather and other circumstances”
affecting productivity. Ultimately, performance evaluation came
down to the judgment of the magistrate. It is unlikely that the
special magistrates or justices were completely impartial when
applying Smyth’s recommendations in the field since their adju-
dications must have been influenced by their experience, atti-
tude towards abolition, and attachment to local planter inter-
ests. The following sworn report by the aforementioned
plantation manager Lowenfeld, who also served as a local jus-
tice, illustrates the subjectivity inherent in adjudication proceed-
ings:
I have read over the evidence of Mustick, foreman on
Lonsdale; he states, what I knew to be the truth, that in
weeding three persons are put to each bed; the bed is
from 65 to 70 roeds; each person taking a row of coffee
15
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trees. This is the amount of work given on coffee estates
generally, and which is performed very frequently in
less than five hours; under any circumstance this is a
task which could easily be performed in less than 71⁄2
hours. Weeding to be with the hoe. On Gebroeden the
women often do the same quantity of work in 41⁄2
hours. In assorting coffee, 80 lbs is an easy task; the
women on coffee estates earn extra wages for clearing a
further quantity [CO 111/151, p. 281].
Edward Hicks, the other “unbiased” examiner in this case, had
himself been a coffee planter for 18 years [Enclosure in Des-
patch 367, 14 August 1837, Smyth to Glenelg, BPP, 1837-38, Vol.
85, II, p. 96].
Regulating Sales and Valuations of Apprentices: CAP. X of British
Guiana’s Ordinance allowed planters to continue selling, leasing,
or otherwise disposing of apprentices just as they had done with
slaves prior to the Abolition Act. The only exception provided
that “no such apprenticed labourer shall be publicly exhibited or
compelled to attend at the place of sale, as was the custom with
respect to slaves.” Again, the process was regulated through
careful documentation of the transactions. Sales of the “services
of apprenticed labourers” were recorded in a Vendue Sales Book
that was kept in a designated Vendue Office. Information re-
corded in the book included the date of sale, name of seller,
name and age of laborer, classification (praedial or non-prae-
dial), and price [Document A in Enclosure to Despatch 242, 28
October 1835, BPP, 1836, Vol. 83, p. 70].
One of the areas reserved by the Abolition Act for local
legislative action related to “how the necessary Appraisement of
the future Value of such [apprenticeship] services shall be
made” [CO 111/142, CAP 73, p. 672]. Valuations of the human
“livestock” had been a traditional feature of plantation record
keeping under slavery for a variety of reasons including probat-
ing wills, providing collateral for bank loans, buying and selling
slaves, hiring slaves in and out, or monitoring the performance
of agents by absentee owners [Fleischman et al., 2004].
The main reason for such appraisals envisioned by the Brit-
ish government during apprenticeship, however, was to enable
apprentices to buy their own freedom. In these instances, it was
in the planters’ interests to inflate the valuation. According to
Green [1976, p. 133], “biased decisions were the rule,” as the
appraisement tribunals normally comprised two planters com-
pared to one independent judge. One of the two appraisers
16
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would be appointed by the employer, the other by the judiciary
(typically a special justice), with a judge acting as “umpire” in
the absence of agreement between the first two referees. The
planter bias is evident from the government returns for British
Guiana for the period April to December 1837. Of 136 valuations
taking place, there were 56 instances where the employer’s valu-
ation exceeded that of the special justice, compared to only one
that was lower. The remaining 79 valuations were the same,
doubtlessly the result of collusion. Furthermore, in most cases
the umpires favored the planters. In 34 out of the 56 valuations
where there was a difference in favor of the planter, the verdict
of the umpire was either the same as that of the employer’s
appraiser or closer to it than to the special justice’s valuation
[Enclosure in Despatch 134, 26 July 1837, Smyth to Glenelg,
BPP, 1837-38, Vol. 85, pp. 152-153; Enclosure in Despatch 137,
27 November 1837, Smyth to Glenelg, BPP, 1837-38, Vol. 85, pp.
156-157; Enclosure in Despatch 138, 19 January 1838, Smyth to
Glenelg, BPP, 1837-38, Vol. 85, pp. 157-159].
The Colonial Office knew about the bias associated with the
valuation practice [Despatch 250, 13 November 1835, Smyth to
Glenelg, BPP, 1836, Vol. 83, pp. 99-100]. Indeed, Smyth tried to
remedy the situation in British Guiana by requiring full details
to be published of the name, age, and sex of the apprentice,
amount of appraisement, identity of the appraisers, and approv-
ing judge. It was hoped that this policy of full disclosure would
act “as a check upon exorbitant and unfair appraisements” [Des-
patch 259, 11 March 1836, Smyth to Glenelg, BPP, 1836, Vol. 83,
p. 148]. However, the relatively small number of apprentices
who were able to afford to buy their release in the first three
months of 1836 suggests the strategy did not work [Enclosure in
Despatch 266, 6 May 1836, Smyth to Glenelg, BPP, 1836, Vol.
83, pp. 178-179]. It may also be concluded that a number of
valuation procedures resulted from the buying and selling of
plantations or the rental of apprentice labor.
The continuation of valuations during the apprenticeship
period reflected the workers’ ongoing lack of freedom. They re-
mained economic commodities with a market value, albeit one
that was in decline as full emancipation approached. The de-
crease in value can be seen from the annual series of valuations
of the Marshall’s Pen and Martin’s Hill plantation in Jamaica.
The average value of the slaves in the years prior to the Aboli-
tion Act was around £100 [Crawford Papers, 23/14/8]. In 1834, it
fell to £25, with the Abolition Act about to come into force
[Crawford Papers, 25/11/653]. On the Lowther plantations in
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Barbados, the reduction was from £75 to £50 [Lowther Planta-
tions, 43507/7-25]. In 1838, the last year of apprenticeship, the
figure for Marshall’s Pen and Martin’s Hill dropped to £11/6/8
[Crawford Papers, 25/11/656]. From 1839, the annual valuations
of livestock continued there, but they were now confined to
horned stock and mules. Linked to the annual valuations were
the schedules of the increases and decreases occurring during
the year in the numbers of slaves/apprentices. These reports
were intended to encourage plantation managers to preserve the
human capital by rendering them accountable to the owners for
any deaths [Roughley, 1823, p. 28]. Again we see this practice
continuing during the apprenticeship period until it was aban-
doned when the owners lost control of the work force [Lowther
Plantations, 43507/27-30; Crawford Papers, 25/11/647, 656].
From 1839, the “Negroes” had become “daily labourers,” and
weekly pay lists started to appear [Crawford Papers, 25/11/647].
Regulating the Penal System and the Judiciary: The law reflected
the apprentices’ newly found status as freedmen by taking pun-
ishments out of the hands of the plantation overseers and regu-
lating the severity of penalties that could be inflicted. One of the
Abolition Act’s key provisions was to forbid masters from flog-
ging apprentice workers. Corporal punishment did not end,
however, either officially or unofficially. Unofficially there were
many cases of illegal beatings on plantations [Paton, 2004, p.
69]; officially that particular task was given to the special magis-
trates or justices to administer. Women, however, were now
exempt. The figures for British Guiana show that from August 1,
1834 to July 31, 1835, a total of 8,152 punishments were admin-
istered, of which 2,177 (26.7%) were corporal punishments [En-
closure 2 in Despatch 236, 19 September 1835, Smyth to
Glenelg, BPP, 1836, Vol. 83, p. 55]. In the case of British Guiana,
special justices were restricted to 15 lashes when acting alone
[Enclosure B in Despatch 117, 13 October 1834, Smyth to
Spring Rice, BPP, 1835, Vol. 81, p. 291], compared to the maxi-
mum of 30 allowed in the colony’s Ordinance [CO 111/142, CAP.
IV, Section 6]. CAP. II, Section 3 of the same document pre-
scribed the full range of punishments available to special jus-
tices:
And be it further enacted, that every Special Justice
shall be and he is hereby empowered and authorized, in
respect of apprenticed labourers convicted of offences
before him, to award any one of the following punish-
18
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ments: - 1. Confinement with or without hard labour on
the Tread Mill, or otherwise, for a period not exceeding
fourteen successive days; 2. Extra labour at the rate of
fifteen hours per week in the service of his or her em-
ployer, with or without confinement at night, for a pe-
riod not exceeding fourteen days; 3. Fifteen stripes for
every male labourer. And in respect of an employer, or
person acting for him, when convicted of any violation
of the present law, a penalty not exceeding Five Pounds
sterling, or in the case of protraction of labour of an
apprenticed labourer by force or fraud, a fine of One
Shilling per hour.
Each colony was required to maintain detailed records on
the quantity and nature of fines, imprisonments, and corporal
punishment to enable the Colonial Office to monitor compliance
with the regulations. Burn [1937, p. 207] noted, for example,
that whenever a Jamaican special magistrate imposed flogging
as punishment, “the number of lashes to be given must be en-
tered in the Estate Book.” A summary of punishments for the
first 22 months of apprenticeship in four of the colonies, which
is reproduced in Table 2, was compiled from these records by
TABLE 2
Summary of Punishments Inflicted on the
Apprenticed Laborers in the British Colonies
1 August 1834 to 31 May 1836
Total for Jamaica, Barbados, British Guiana, a Grenada, and St. Lucia
(British Guiana figures in parentheses):
Number of Apprenticed Labourers 433,000 (72,000)
Number punished
Males 56,938 (7,691)
Females 42,502 (8,539)
Total 99,440 (16,230)
By Flogging 17,050 (2,668)
Average Number of Stripes 141⁄2 - 221⁄2 (20)
Total Amount of Lashes 353,601 (53,360)
Other Punishments b 82,390 (13,562)
a “Many offences committed by Apprenticed Labourers of a petty character,
instead of being adjudicated by Special Justices, are sent before the inferior
Criminal Court, where the almost invariable punishment ordered to be in-
flicted is flogging. These do not appear in the flogging table.
b Includes hard labour – in penal gangs, and worked in chains; extra labour;
tread mill, stocks, dark cells, imprisonment, solitary confinement, fines, etc.
Source: Enclosure in Despatch 108, 2 July 1834, Smyth to Stanley, BPP, 1835,
Vol. 81, p. 274.
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the anti-slavery campaigner, John Scoble, in August 1837 [CO
318/128, West India Miscellaneous, 1837, Vol. 1].10
Smyth refuted many of the incidents Scoble cited during his
stay in British Guiana [Despatch 300, 7 April 1837, Smyth to
Glenelg, BPP, 1836-37, Vol. 84, II, p. 77]. However, Scoble’s
involvement shows the potential of accounting to act as an
emancipating force in society once data become publicly avail-
able, which has been observed in other 19th century venues
[Gallhofer and Haslam, 2003; Brackenborough, 2003]. Indeed,
the culpability of accounting in the practice of slavery is not a
one-sided issue. The pressure exerted by the British government
on the colonial authorities to keep proper accounts of punish-
ments arguably protected the apprentices against the worse
treatment they would otherwise have received had no records
been kept.11
The judiciary was itself held accountable to the Colonial
Office through the regular filing of reports. CAP. II, Section 6 of
British Guiana’s Ordinance, for example, specified the particular
data that should be recorded regularly by the SJs:
 Every Special Justice and every District Session of Spe-
cial Justices shall keep a journal of all the cases brought
before him or them, in which shall be entered – 1st, the
date of the complaint; 2nd, the name of the complainant;
3rd, the name of the accused; 4th, the substance of the
complaint; 5th, the names of the witnesses adduced on
either side; 6th, the substance of the evidence; 7th, the
decision on the case; 8th, whether the decision has been
carried into effect; and to every case shall be added any
general remarks which may be thought advisable; and
all such journals shall be kept in one uniform manner,
to be prescribed for that purpose by the Governor and
Court of Policy.
In summary, the special justices were accountable to the special
magistrates, who were responsible for overseeing their work in
the district. The special magistrates, in turn, were obliged to
submit a monthly summary report to the Colonial Office in ad-
10 Green [1983, p. 103] described Scoble as “the indefatigable abolitionist.”
Scoble toured British Guiana in 1839 and reported “damningly” on the condi-
tion of indentured Indian laborers that were recruited to address the labor short-
ages on plantations. Green noted that Scoble’s report was published in 1840,
entitled ”Hill Coolies, A Brief Exposition of the Deplorable Condition of the Hill
Coolies in British Guiana and Mauritius.”
11 We gratefully acknowledge Barry Higman for making this point in his
helpful comments on an earlier draft of the paper.
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dition to internal reports, the nature and frequency of which
varied from colony to colony. In Jamaica, for example, Governor
Sligo required his special magistrates to file a weekly report as
well as to provide immediate notice of every valuation they con-
ducted [Burn, 1937, p. 207]. In British Guiana, there was a
monthly reporting interval.12
Although the content of the reports varied, the two repro-
duced in Figures 1 and 2 are generally representative [Enclosure
A in Despatch 119, 16 December 1834, Smyth to Spring Rice,
BPP, 1835, Vol. 81, pp. 293-294].
12 Similar, albeit less frequent, reports of judicial proceedings had been re-
quired of the Slave Protector in British Guiana in the period prior to apprentice-
ship [BPP, 1836, Vol. 83, p. 55].
FIGURE 1
Monthly Special Justice Report
District B
Sir, Vryheid’s Lust, 30 Nov. 1834.
I have the honour to transmit a monthly report, agreeable to the request of
his Excellency the Lieut.-governor.
1st. The apprenticed labourers in District B. are contented, cheerful and
civil, with the exception of the following estates: plantations Paradise and
Bachelor’s Adventure.
2d. They have not performed their work with alacrity and good will, on the
above two estates. On the other plantations the work has been well done.
3d. There has been no instance of resisting authority by force. Insubordina-
tion has been general on the two above-mentioned plantations.
4th. Those that are disposed to neglect their work, are frequently rude and
insolent to those in authority over them. Such misconduct has not been general,
and I do not attribute it to any combination or conspiracy. It is only with respect
to a few idle disorderly apprentices that any complaints are made.
5th. The attendance of the apprentices at church and at school has been
regular during the preceding month, and to the full extent of the accommoda-
tion afforded. The attendance of the young at the Sunday school, the same as the
preceding month.
6th. As an individual magistrate I have been under the necessity of punish-
ing three with whipping. There have been four delinquents punished with whip-
ping, by order of the court, during the preceding month.
I have, &c.
Henry Gloster, Esq. A.M. Lyons, S.J.P., Chairman District B.
Gov. Secretary
Source: Enclosure A. in Despatch No. 119, 16 December 1834, Smyth to Spring-
Rice, BPP, 1835, Vol. 81, pp. 293-294.
21
Tyson et al.: Accounting, coercion and social control during apprenticeship: Converting slave workers to wage workers in the British West Indies, c1834-1838
Published by eGrove, 2005
Accounting Historians Journal, December 2005222
FIGURE 2
Monthly Special Justice Report
District C
Office of Special Justices, George Town
Sir, 17 Dec. 1834.
In obedience to his Excellency the Lieut.-governor’s confidential order of the
23rd of September last, I have the honour to state for his information, in answer
to –
Query 1st. That the apprenticed labourers of this district, during this month
(November), have certainly exhibited a better feeling than in the last, on very
many properties. That within the Town district, incivility and rudeness towards
their employers and those in authority under them, have not disappeared.
Query 2d. That during this month (November), the work on various estates
has been performed in a manner leading me to suppose that the misunderstand-
ing previously existing is wearing away. But it is not to be expected that, until
they fully understand the benefits accruing to them, and something like a fixed
rate of wages is fallen into for their extra hours, that alacrity and good will may
be expected.
Query 3d. The instances of insubordination and unlawful combination have
decreased considerably this month; nor have there been any attempts to resist
authority by force, except in one or two instances of persons in a state of
intoxication.
Query 4th. The cases which have been manifested in this month (November),
of combination to neglect their work, and to disobey lawful orders, have de-
creased more than one half.
Query 5th. The attendance of the apprenticed labourers at church and at
school are proceeding in an increased ratio.
Query 6th. I have individually as a magistrate, and the district courts under
my charge have, still found it necessary to punish by flogging; but the instances
have decreased during this month (November), to 37 instead of 72, of which the
greatest number was inflicted on persons who had run away since the months of
August and September as follows:
Running away --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 15
In subordination, and not doing a sufficient quantity of work,
Disobedience and insolence ----------------------------------------------------- 3
Carelessly, indolently and negligently doing their work --------------------- 3
Drunkenness, &c. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 2
Absenting from duty -------------------------------------------------------------------- 3
Unlawful combination not to do a sufficient quantity of work,
And to resist lawful orders ----------------------------------------------------- 11
I have, &c.
S.W. Gordon, Chairman District C.
Source: Enclosure A. in Despatch N. 119, Smyth to Spring-Rice, BPP, 1835, Vol.
81, pp. 293-294.
22
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 32 [2005], Iss. 2, Art. 9
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol32/iss2/9
223Tyson, Oldroyd and Fleischman: Accounting During Apprenticeship
Most noteworthy were the range of social issues that Smyth
asked special magistrates to report and his overriding concern
for peace and stability within the colony. Detailed economic
data were also collected over a wide range of issues and passed
back to London regularly via the governor-generals [e.g., Des-
patch 126, 6 July 1835, Smyth to Glenelg, BPP, 1836-37, Vol. 84,
pp. 305-306; Enclosure D in Despatch 140, 21 June 1835, Sligo
to Glenelg, BPP, 1835, Vol. 81, pp. 352-399].
DISCUSSION
Apprenticeship was not an isolated experiment but rather
one element of a wider, inter-connected dialogue of social and
behavioral reforms in the 1820s and 1830s. Thus, economic ra-
tionalism, based on our understanding of modern labor rela-
tions, only provides a partial explanation of the system of labor
control and accounting adopted during apprenticeship. For ex-
ample, the plantation wage records of the Tharp plantations of
Jamaica in the post-emancipation period suggest that appren-
tices were paid on a piece rate basis over the various plantation
tasks, but it is interesting that specific piece rates and output
levels were not noted in the books [Tharp Papers, R55/7/127/1/
1]. Unlike contemporary British factory workers, apprentices liv-
ing in larger colonies with vacant lands could pursue peasant
farming and were generally disinclined to increase their pay
through added effort. In Britain, the creation of free and willing
wage labor was the result of a “long process of revolution in the
social relations of production, particularly enclosures that de-
prived workers of the means of subsistence.”13 Arguably, such a
change in attitudes and opportunities could not be imposed sud-
denly [Thompson, 1967, pp. 80-81, 90], as was the attempt with
apprenticeship.
Clearly much work lies ahead in exploring the accounting
implications of these issues. In this respect, some of the most
influential work to date concerns applying the ideas of Michel
Foucault relating prison discipline to discipline of the industrial
work force [Armstrong, 1994]. Foucault’s [1991] conclusions
were based on the contrast between traditional and reformed
penal regimes. Here in the West Indies in the 1830s, we find
some of the earliest scientific prisons expressly designed to re-
form the behavior of the “inmates” by making them law-abiding,
13 We acknowledge a reviewer for this comment on the historical develop-
ment of British labor.
23
Tyson et al.: Accounting, coercion and social control during apprenticeship: Converting slave workers to wage workers in the British West Indies, c1834-1838
Published by eGrove, 2005
Accounting Historians Journal, December 2005224
compliant workers.14 Other non- Foucauldian studies have con-
sidered the formation of the state in relation to government
control of company law [e.g., Edwards et al., 1997]. Again, gov-
ernment intervention in society during apprenticeship took
place on an unprecedented scale in the British Empire, regulat-
ing the actions of landowners as well as workers, and “heralding
future change” [Paton, 2004, p. 66].
Another contemporary determinant of the call for greater
work discipline is the role played by Quakers in the abolition
movement in Britain and the U.S. [Cooke, 2003]. Central to the
Quaker ethic of “responsibility” was the notion of the “self-disci-
plined worker,” which also impinged on prison reform. The aim
of modern prisons was to transform deviants into “dependable
and willing workers” through subjecting them to a “habit-shap-
ing regimen” of regular work and strict social control. In this
respect, apprenticeship provided a test case for Quakers, for if
former slaves in the Caribbean could be inculcated with a sense
of work discipline, the same could be achieved at home “with
vagabonds, whores, felons, and deviants of every kind” [Davis,
1992, pp. 52-53].
The powers granted to West Indian magistrates is an addi-
tional factor relating to work discipline that should be noted.
The Orders in Council of 1824 and 1830 reflect the British
government’s intent to regulate corporal punishment and limit
the discretionary powers of magistrates during the apprentice-
ship period [Orders in Council, 10 March 1824, BPP, 1825, Vol.
26, pp. 124-138; Orders in Council, 1 May 1830, BPP, 1830-31,
Vol. 16, pp. 93-138]. These acts specified the nature and quantity
of corporal punishments that could be administered and mir-
rored the “push for uniformity” that was “perhaps the most per-
sistent motor” driving the new scientific approach to penal
policy in Britain at that time [Wiener, 1990, pp. 103-107]. The
installation of treadmills in parishes throughout the West Indies
during apprenticeship also typified the shift from corporal to
self discipline and was intended to painfully promote an inner
ethic to work willingly and cooperatively. Originally invented in
1818 and introduced into British prisons in the 1820s, the great
attraction of the treadmill was that its “mechanical operation
14 Cooke [2003] presents the interesting example of a 150 foot tall watch
tower on a Cuban plantation in 1835 that provided a 360 degree panoptical view
of slaves at work. The ability to monitor slaves in such a manner lends support
to a Foucauldian view of management history.
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meant that it supposedly required the same labor from all who
worked on it” [Paton, 2004, p. 88].15
It is important to be clear about the role of accounting
during apprenticeship because of the wider implications dis-
cussed above. As we have seen, accounting was integral to a
social system which was built on a hierarchy of accountability.
First, the workers were held accountable for putting in a reason-
able effort on the plantations through the imposition of work
standards and accounting returns which monitored output. Sec-
ond, the planters were held accountable for complying with the
regulations relating to the treatment of their workers through
regular inspections by the justices and magistrates. The ultimate
means of redress was prosecution under the law, with fines for
recalcitrant planters and floggings or incarceration for the work-
ers. Finally, the judiciary was itself held accountable to the Colo-
nial Office in London through regular reports. In short, the role
of accounting was coercive.
The complicity of accounting in the reformed prison re-
gimes of the West Indies and indeed elsewhere awaits research,
but as far as external reporting is concerned, accounting during
apprenticeship was intended to coerce the various parties into
submission rather than to encourage them to provide their labor
services willingly through bonuses, time off, or other incentives.
Socially “engineering” an ethic to work was left to other initia-
tives and institutions that included the establishment of schools,
religious education, reforming prisons, etc. Accounting returns
that were submitted to London included quantified measures of
the success of these initiatives, such as “the number of commu-
nicants who have received the Holy Sacrament during the last
quarter, the marriages which have taken place, and the numbers
15 At the beginning of apprenticeship, the treadmill was considered an ideal
punishment. It was especially useful as a substitute for the flogging of women,
now prohibited under the Abolition Act. The punishment fell into disrepute
through misuse, however. Captain J.W. Pringle, in a report to Parliament in
1838, described how treadmills were used in Jamaican prisons: “On many of the
wheels the prisoners are strapped by their wrists to the rail, so that, if they do
not tread, they must hang, the steps hitting their shins. This I witnessed in
several instances with both men and women. They appeared to hang in this
manner purely from obstinacy, and that they could have stepped had they tried
to do so. As the wheels were not revolving rapidly, their shins were only slightly
hurt. At Kingston and Vere, however, cats were regularly hung up under the
wheel; and at the former place the supervisor admitted that it was used by his
authority when the prisoners would not step properly. The supervisor and the
mayor of Kingston prevented my examining the prisoners themselves . . . ” [CO
318/136, p. 8].
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who attended either daily, afternoon, or Sunday schools” [Des-
patch 193, 23 July 1836, Smyth to Glenelg, BPP, 1836-37, Vol.
84, p. 458]. Other schemes for social improvement included the
distribution of Bibles [CO 318/118/384], providing separate
schools for females to enable them be “instructed in those arts
of useful industry which belong exclusively” to them [CO 318/
118/406], and presenting medals for good behavior. As to this
later point, Governor Smyth wrote: “I periodically visit the dif-
ferent churches and chapels, as well as the parish and other
schools, and distribute medals amongst the most attentive and
best behaved of the scholars of both sexes” [Despatch 253, 12
December 1835, Smyth to Glenelg, BPP, 1836, Vol. 83, p. 106].
Smyth’s criteria for awarding medals were set out in a gov-
ernment notice reproduced in Figure 3 [Enclosure in Despatch
272, 1 June 1836, Glenelg to Smyth, BPP, 1836, Vol. 83, p. 196].
FIGURE 3
Government Notice
Major-general Sir James Carmichael Smyth hereby offers, and will present
in the month of January 1837, in the name of His Majesty, the following honor-
ary medals:
1. A gold medal, of value of five guineas, to the manager of that estate in the
district of Demerary on which, in comparison with the number of appren-
ticed labourers attached to such estate, the greatest happiness, industry
and contentment shall have prevailed during the year 1836. The high sher-
iff and two special justices will form the committee to select the manager.
2. Ditto for the District of Essequebo. The sheriff of Essequebo, and two of
the special justices of the Essequebo district to form the committee.
3. Ditto for the District of Berbice. The sheriff of Berbice, and two of the
special justices of the Berbice district to form the committee.
4. A gold medal, of the value of five guineas, to the manager of that estate in
the district of Demerary on which, with reference to the number of ap-
prenticed labourers attached to such estate, there shall have been the
greatest number of clean healthy children attending school, during the
year 1836.
5. The same for the district of Essequebo.
6. The same for the district of Berbice.
Candidates for the above medals are requested to have the goodness to
send in their names as early in the month of January as may be conve-
nient, in order that their respective claims may be referred to the commit-
tee with as little delay as possible.
The rectors or ministers of the several parishes (as the case may be)
will be requested to join the committee in selecting the individuals to
whom the three last-named medals are to be presented.
By Order of his Excellency the Lieutenant-governor,
Guiana Public Buildings Henry John Baird,
26 May 1836 Assist. Gov. Sec.
Source: Enclosures with Despatch No. 272, Glenelg to Smyth, BPP, 1836, Vol.
83, p. 196.
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Accounting’s lack of direct involvement in social engineer-
ing does not imply that the system of governance and underly-
ing reporting practices adopted did not change people’s atti-
tudes and beliefs. Paton [2004, pp. 78-81], for example,
described an incident of apprentice resistance in 1834 that cul-
minated in the removal of a special magistrate from his posi-
tion. The episode demonstrated the awareness among a gang of
apprentices in Jamaica of their rights and obligations under the
newly found legislation and a belief in its efficacy for seeking
redress. Adamson [1975, p. 463] documented a similar event
occurring in British Guiana in 1842. Another possible example
of shifts in attitude concerns the use of scale-rates as a means of
defining reasonable work effort during apprenticeship. These
were akin to the task-rates that became increasingly popular on
some plantations after 1807, and resulted in a discourse be-
tween managers and laborers not dissimilar to the later one
surrounding the use of standard costing in industry [Tyson et
al., 2004]. The readiness with which scale-rates were devised
under apprenticeship suggests that tasking was well known in
the British West Indies as a means of organizational control in
the slavery era even within the context of supervised gangs.
The fundamental nature of accounting as an instrument of
coercion during apprenticeship is illustrated by the fact that
corporal punishment meted out on the basis of accounting evi-
dence remained the ultimate deterrent for non-compliant work-
ers. It has been suggested that the Foucauldian distinction be-
tween pre-modern and modern prison regimes, the one based on
physical punishment and public spectacles, the other on mental
control behind closed walls, was not entirely clear-cut in prac-
tice [Wiener, 1990, p. 101; Arnold, 1992]. This was certainly the
case in the West Indies, and indeed Great Britain through to the
20th century, with pain still being inflicted on the prisoner’s
body [Paton, 2004, pp. 10, 105-106]. This kind of blurring was
also true of accounting during apprenticeship. Accounting
formed part of a strikingly modern social apparatus that sought
to inculcate former slaves with a sense of work discipline that
would hold good after apprenticeship had ended and they be-
came free laborers. But to a large extent, accounting itself re-
tained its traditional role of enforcing rights and obligations
rather than enacting behavioral change.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This paper has described the multiple roles of accounting
during the apprenticeship period in the British West Indies. Un-
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der slavery, planters maintained complete control by physically
compelling slaves to perform tasks, and they were legally sanc-
tioned to flog them for failing to perform to expectations. Dur-
ing apprenticeship, planters were precluded from using the lash
to compel work effort, but rather than providing sufficient in-
ducements for workers to exchange their labor power willingly,
planters, colonial legislatures, and Parliamentary leaders be-
lieved that former slaves would only work on plantations under
enforced compulsion. These power holders colluded to establish
a complex system of rules, regulations, and prescribed behaviors
that would “replace the slave-owners’ authority and secure the
workers’ new contract terms” [Turner, 1999, p. 19].
While accounting practices did not drive apprenticeship,
they played an important role in sustaining its complex social-
control mechanisms. Absent the ability to use indiscriminate
floggings to ensure work obedience, detailed records were kept
to document absences, work effort, and contract violations, all
of which were used to maintain the plantocracy’s dominance
over labor. The planters and judiciary were in turn held ac-
countable by a reporting network feeding into the Colonial Of-
fice in London.
The information that was regularly submitted to the Colo-
nial Office was both detailed and profuse, and served to illumi-
nate not just the practices under apprenticeship, but also during
the earlier slave era. It cast light on the punishment regime
during slavery, and helps answer the contentious question posed
by planters and abolitionists alike of whether slaves were better
or worse off than British factory workers. Wilberforce himself
observed:
The difference, then, between the free-born Englishman
and the negro seems to be this, that one is compelled to
labour while he is able by the pinching of hunger, the
shivering of cold, or the horrors of a jail; and the other
is forced to it when he is well fed and clothed, and in
sound health, by the terrors of the cart whip [Knox,
1789, p. 15].
In point of fact, apprenticed workers may not have been treated
uniquely – the British laboring classes also faced physical pun-
ishments through the penal system if they refused to comply.
However, the difference in severity is difficult to ascertain be-
cause the abolitionists had a vested interest in popularizing a
picture of unremitting cruelty on plantations, whereas the con-
verse was true of planters [Knox, 1789, pp. 41-43, 64; Roughley,
1823, p. 75].
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Apprenticeship may be seen as one element within a wider
scientific movement to instill a sense of work discipline into the
poorer elements of British society, including factories, work-
houses, prisons, as well as plantations [e.g. Thompson, 1967;
Walker, 2004]. While accounting was used to monitor the eco-
nomic performance of an entity, its primary purpose in the Car-
ibbean was to sustain a complex, racially-based, social regime
by policing workplace relationships and arrangements. There is
little evidence to suggest that accounting was used to create
incentives or effect behavioral change whereby workers would
more willingly provide labor services or accumulate a surplus.
Once accounting is perceived as a social apparatus that is
used to bolster or maintain the dominance of one group over
another, a number of historical situations present themselves
for further study. Comparisons of accounting practices in the
United States and the Caribbean during their respective transi-
tions from slavery, as well as of accounting practices in appren-
tice plantations and concurrent British factories, are two possi-
bilities. Further research is also needed to understand
accounting’s role in the mid-late 19th century drive to develop
willing and productive workers that were essential to meet the
demands of expanding industrialized economies.
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